> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.darknyx.trade/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. > How Darknyx prevents accidental self-matches using note-bound owner identity plus trading-key equality. # Self trade prevention # Self-Trade Prevention **TL;DR** Orders backed by notes with the same **owner commitment** never match each other, even when they use different trading keys. Trading-key equality is checked as a second guard. If your bid and ask cross, the engine skips that self-pair and keeps both eligible against other traders. ## The rule The primary identity is the collateral note's **owner commitment**. The enclave re-derives the signed note commitment from its opening at intake, so a caller cannot simply claim a different owner for a note they do not control. The normal SDK derives one wallet-level owner commitment and reuses it across that wallet's notes. The matcher also compares trading keys. A self-pair is skipped if **either** the note-bound owner commitment or the trading key matches. ```text theme={null} same wallet, same key → skipped same wallet, different keys → skipped different owners → eligible to match ``` Skipped orders are not automatically cancelled. They remain eligible to match with a different owner in the same batch or a later tick. ## Why a single behavior On a continuous order book, self-trade prevention comes in flavors (cancel the resting side, cancel the incoming side, cancel both) because there is a maker and a taker to choose between. A Darknyx batch has no maker/taker ordering: all crossing orders clear together at one price (see [Clearing Price](./clearing-price.mdx)). There is no "resting vs. incoming" side to pick, so the honest behavior is a single rule: **two orders are skipped when either their note-bound owner commitments or their trading keys match**. Both remain available to match against everyone else. ## What it protects * **No accidental wash trades.** A market maker quoting both sides cannot accidentally trade two notes from the same wallet, even when strategies use separate trading keys. * **Cleaner execution records.** Every fill is against a distinct note owner. ## What it is not This is not proof of unique human identity. A user can deliberately create a second wallet identity with another spending key, and the two owner commitments will look like distinct counterparties. Preventing that kind of pseudonymous wash trading requires an identity or surveillance policy outside the matching rule. The protection is therefore strong against accidental self-matching within the normal wallet model, not a Sybil-resistance claim.